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EVIDENCE - UsE OF TRANSCRIPT OF GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS TO
REFRESH MEMORY OF WITNESS - RIGHT OF OPPONENT TO INSPECT
TRANSCRIPT - In a criminal prosecution under the anti-trust laws, counsel
for the United States, in the cross-examination of witnesses for the defense,
based certain questions iipon a transcript of the testimony of these same witnesses
before the grand jury. The transcripts were used for the sole purpose of refreshing the memories of the hostile witnesses. The transcripts were not placed in
the hands of the witnesses, but the witnesses were asked, "Did you testify thusand-so before the grand jury?" The district court refused the demand of the
defense counsel that they be allowed to inspect the transcript thus used for the
purpose of re-direct examination of the witnesses. Held, such refusal was erroneous. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939)
105 F. (2d) 809.
At common law, the proceedings of the grand jury were veiled in secrecy.1
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It was formerly held that a grand juror could not, at a subsequent trial, be
asked to state the testimony that a witness had given before them.2 It has been
intimated that such a rule was never applied to one who was a mere witness
before the grand jury.8 But it is now generally held that a grand juror may be
called to show that the statements of a witness at the trial of the accused are in
contradiction to those made by him before the grand jury.4 In several states,
express statutory provisions have been enacted removing the seal from the lips
of the grand juror in certain specified instances,5 and the exceptions provided
for in such statutes are not deemed to be exclusive in their provisions. 6 Such
results do seem to be founded upon sound logic, as after an indictment has been
returned by the grand jury all reason for the secrecy of the proceedings vanishes. 7 The great weight of authority today condones the use of a transcript of

§ 2360 (1923); In re Cohen's Estate, 105 Misc. 724, 174 N. Y. S. 427 (1919);
State v. Fasset, 16 Conn. 457 (1844).
2
5 JoNES, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., § 2206 (1926); Imlay v. Rogers, 7 N. J. L. 347
(1800), overruled in State v. Bovino, 89 N. J. L. 586, 99 A. 313 (1916), where the
court adopted the more modern view; 12 VINER, ABRIDGEMENT OF LAw AND EQUITY,
2d ed., 20 (1792). In State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688 at 705, 85 P. 784 (1906), the
court said: "By the common law a grand jury was not permitted to disclose how any
witness testified before that body or how any member voted."
8
State v. Fish, 90 N. J. L. 17, 100 A. 181 (1917). In this case, 90 N. J. L. at
19, the court said, "A witness who has been examined before a grand jury is under no
legal obligation to refrain from stating what was said to and by him while there."
This case was reversed on appeal, State v. Fish, 91 N. J. L. 228, 102 A. 378 (1917).
4
5 JoNES, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., § 2206 (1926); State v. McPherson, 114 Iowa
492, 87 N. W. 421 (1901); State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267 (1874). For a good discussion of this evolution, read Commonwealth v. Mead, 12 Gray (78 Mass.) 167
{1858).
~ For example, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 9-817: "A member of the grand
jury may, however, be required by any court to disclose the testimony of a witness
examined before the grand jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that given by the witness before the court; or to disclose the testimony
given before them by any person upon a charge against him for perjury in giving his
testimony or upon the trial therefor."
6
Hinshaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334, 47 N. E. 157 (1897). In State v. Campbell,
73 Kan. 688 at 710, 85 P. 784 (1906), the court quoted with approval 4 W1GMORE,
EVIDENCE, § 2363 (1904): "Nor should any of the ensuing legitimate purposes of
disclosure be considered to be obstructed by the statutory omission to mention
them. • • ." The same statement is found in the second edition of Wigmore, same
section.
1
5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., § 2360 (1923). Professor Wigmore says that
the reasons for the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings are fourfold: (1) to secure
the grand jurors themselves from the fear that their opinions and votes may be disclosed; (2) to secure the complainants and witnesses from disclosure of their testimony
in order that the state may obtain willing witnesses ( this is the most pertinent reason
in the instant case); (3) to prevent the guilty accused from fleeing arrest, suborning
perjury, or tampering with witnesses; (4) to protect the innocent accused from disclosure of the fact that he has been groundlessly accused. In § 2362, at page 154,
Professor Wigmore says: "There remain, therefore, on principle, no cases at all in
which, after the grand j1,ry's functions are ended, the privileges of the witnesses not
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the testimony of witnesses taken before the grand jury, "whenever it becomes
necessary to the course of justice." 8 Consequently, it would seem that the decision of the court in the instant case, allowing the use of the transcript by the
examining counsel, is sustained by authority and principle. Also, allowing the
prosecution to refresh the memory of the witnesses by reading portions of the
transcript to them would seem justified in view of the fact that the purpose of
such procedure was evidently to lay a foundation for impeachment.9 With
regard to the right of the defense counsel to inspect the transcript, whenever
a memorandum is used to refresh the memory of a witness, the opponent, as a
general rule, has a right to inspect the memorandum in order: (I) to see
whether the memorandum has a legitimate tendency to refresh the memory
of the witnesses; ( 2) to facilitate cross-examination or re-direct examination.10
There has been some apparent confusion in regard to the right to inspect grand
jury transcripts used to refresh the memory of a witness, due to the fact that in a
great many cases the right of inspection claimed was not in connection with
cross-examination but was to ascertain whether grounds existed for a motion to
dismiss the indictment.11 Also, there has been some hesitancy in allowing the
counsel to inspect a grand jury transcript because of the other confidential information contained therein, in addition to that used to refresh the memory of the
to have their testimony disclosed should be deemed to continue. This is, in effect, the
law as generally stated to-day. . •• The common phrase is that disclosure may be
required 'whenever it becomes necessary in the course of justice.' " See also Commonwealth v. Mead, 12 Gray (78 Mass.) 167 (1858); State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688,
85 P. 784 (1906).
8
Metzler v. United States, (C. C. A. 9th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 203; Felder v.
United States, {C. C. A. 2d, 1925) 9 F. (2d) 872; Bosselman v. United States,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1917) 239 F. 82; People v. Salby, 198 Cal. 426, 245 P. 426 (1926);
Mullins v. Commonwealth, 246 Ky. 748, 56 S. W. (2d) 370 (1933); State v. Patton,
255 Mo. 245, 164 S. W. 223 (1914); Glenn v. State, 157 Ala. 12, 47 So. 1034
(1908); State v. Klute, 160 Iowa 170, 140 N. W. 864 (1913); 74 A. L. R. 1042 at
1050 (1931).
9
In the instant case, the transcripts were used on cross-examination, and the
counsel for the government had repeatedly insisted that the witnesses were deliberately
testifying falsely. This would indicate that the use of the transcripts was to lay a
foundation for the impeachment of the witnesses. It has been held that it is
proper to read extracts from minutes of testimony taken before the grand jury for
the purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness and for laying a foundation for
impeachment, and when the purpose is not merely to extract supplementary testimony.
Crafford v. State, 169 Ark. 225, 273 S. W. 13 (1925); State v. Klute, 160 Iowa
170,.140 N. W. 864 (1913).
10
2 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE, 2d ed., § 762 (1923); 5 JoNEs, EVIDENCE, 2d ed.,
§ 2383 (1926); 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 706 (1909), where it was said: "The propriety
of allowing an adverse party to inspect, for the purpose of cross-examination, any
memorandum used by a witness to refresh his memory upon the matters as to which
he is testifying, appears to be universally conceded by the courts"; Morris v. United
States, (C. C. A. 5th, 1907) 149 F. 123; State v. Miller, 234 Mo. 588, 137 S. W.
887 (1911); People v. Schepps, 217 Mich. 406, 186 N. W. 508 (1922).
11
For example, People v. Kresel, 141 Misc. 593, 253 N. Y. S. 372 (1931).
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witness.12 But, as a practical matter, it would seem that the court could adequately insure an inspection of only that portion of the transcript which was
used to refresh the memory of the witness. In the instant case, it was contended
that no right of inspection existed because the portions of the transcript were
read to the witness, instead of placing them in his hands. It is submitted that by
such a technical distinction, an attorney should not be permitted to evade the
right of his opponent 18 to raise the question of whether the memorandum used
is a proper one for the purpose for which it is employed; although, strange
to say, there appears to be an entire absence of prior authority on that precise
point.

12 Metzler v. United States, (C. C. A. 9th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 203; Bailey v.
State, 24 Ala. App. 339, 135 So. 407 (1931).
18 Capodilupe v. Stock & Sons, 237 Mass. 550, 130 N. E. 65 (1921). In Tibbets v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 201 at 203 (1870), it was said: "The production
of the paper might have been of no value to the defendant, but it is the principle thus
sought to be established that is mischievous and dangerous. The right of a party to
protection against the introduction against him of false, forged or manufactured evidence, which he is not permitted to inspect, must not be invaded by a hair's breadth."

